How the EU Can Use Sanctions to Cancel People

Accounts frozen, travel and jobs banned — just for having the wrong opinions.

On December 15, 2025, Kaja Kallas, High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, signed an EU Council decision to place another twelve “natural persons” and two “entities” on the council’s sanctions list, claiming to thus enforce a so-called restrictive measure in response to Russia’s destabilizing actions. “Restrictive measures, or sanctions, are an important tool of the EU’s common foreign and security policy. They enable the EU to respond to global challenges and developments that are contrary to its objectives and values. These sanctions are not punitive, but are intended to change the policy or behavior of the targets in order to promote the objectives of the EU’s common foreign and security policy.”

One stroke of the pen: a person removed

There was some confusion in Switzerland after the decision was announced, as it emerged that retired Swiss colonel Jacques Baud, who lives in Brussels, had also been added to the EU sanctions list. Baud, who has previously worked for NATO and the UN and written several books, is a well-known geopolitical analyst, albeit one who is extremely critical of EU policy. He has appeared on the channel RT a couple of times and has been quoted in some pro-Russian publications. He is not accused of violating any laws, and yet he is being punished with a “civil death”, given no legal means of defending himself. Being added to the list means that Baud’s assets in the EU will be frozen and he will no longer be allowed to travel within the Union.

In addition to Baud, other citizens of the EU and/or other countries have been subject to sanctions. Among those are, for example, Hüseyin Dogrú, a Turkish and German citizen who is primarily known as a critic of Israel; Nathalie Yamb, an anti-neocolonialism activist with Swiss and Cameroonian citizenships; German war correspondents Alina Lipp and Thomas Röper; Ukrainian journalist Diana Panchenko; as well as Xavier Moreau, a geopolitical commentator with French and Russian citizenships. It is noteworthy that in the cases of Jacques Baud and Xavier Moreau, the justification for the sanctions is very brief and literally identical, stating: “He spreads pro-Russian and pro-Kremlin propaganda and conspiracy theories about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, accusing Ukraine, for example, of orchestrating Russia’s invasion in order to join NATO. He is therefore responsible (Jacques Baud, Xavier Moreau) for implementing and supporting the actions or policies of the Russian Federation government that undermine or threaten the stability or security of a third country (Ukraine) through participation in information manipulation and interference.”

The sanctions mechanism is not subject to independent judicial review

Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) is a “brilliant” idea developed by the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2021.

FIMI is defined by the EEAS as follows: “A mostly non-illegal pattern of behaviour that threatens or has the potential to negatively impact values, procedures, and political processes. Such activities are manipulative in nature and are carried out deliberately and in a coordinated manner. The parties involved in such activities may be state or non-state actors, including their representatives both within and outside their territory.”

FIMI may consist of writing articles, compiling analyses, giving interviews, and expressing opinions. The EEAS itself emphasizes that it is not the veracity of the content that is important, but rather whether the information supports a hostile narrative, undermines trust, or conflicts with the EU’s political objectives. Therefore, even a true, fact-based position may be subject to sanctions if it does not fit in with the political narrative adopted by the EU.

This alone should raise questions about the justification for sanctions, but the main problem lies in the fact that EU sanctions are classified as foreign policy “restrictive measures,” and this legal definition allows them to circumvent the foundations of the legal system: the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair hearing, and independence from judicial review. In other words, the EU has managed to create a system whereby the executive, acting within the powers conferred on it by the Treaty of Lisbon, and under its own laws in the name of foreign policy, can label the behaviour of individuals, including its own citizens, as “undesirable” and thereby impose harsh measures on them without any trial. And since Member States are contractually obliged to implement the EU sanctions, victims cannot appeal the decision to local courts, which makes it difficult to appeal to the Court of Human Rights either, as this requires proving that all domestic legal remedies have been exhausted.

Victims of sanctions have the option of turning to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). However, the ECJ only checks whether the description on which the sanctions are based is formally correct. The ECJ does not check whether the “charges” brought and the sanctions imposed are proportionate and whether they violate the fundamental rights of the persons subject to the sanctions or not. The ECJ only checks whether the reasoning described in the decision is factually correct. This means that only if the victims can prove that their entry in the sanctions database is factually incorrect can the ECJ order the EU Council to remove them from the list.

And even if the European Court of Justice finds that the Council used factually incorrect reasoning, the Council can adjust the reasoning at any time and re-enter the persons unto the sanctions list, after which the persons subject to these sanctions must again start over at the European Court of Justice. This happened, for example, to Russian oligarchs Petr Aven and Mikhail Fridman, who won a court case against the EU Council in 2024, but remain on the sanctions list to this day with adjusted grounds.

Thus, the EU Council has essentially absolute and unlimited power to decide who is being sanctioned and for how long. Furthermore, the reasons for imposing sanctions are usually so vague and open to interpretation that it is impossible to effectively challenge them in court.

A completely opaque procedure

In October 2025, Member of the European Parliament Michael von der Schulenburg published a comprehensive legal opinion written at his request by two legal scholars, Prof. Ninon Colneric and Prof. Alina Miron, analyzing the regime of sanctions. Thereby, the procedure for imposing sanctions appears to be completely opaque. It is impossible to know what lies behind the decision, who makes it, and why and on what criteria certain individuals are selected to be on that list. The minutes of the decision-making process are secret, and only a brief description of the decision is actually published. And to add insult to injury, von der Schulenburg finds it most worrying that almost no one seems to care about the situation that has arisen. “The mainstream media pays almost no attention to it. In the European Parliament, I have the support of no more than ten MEPs. The EU is destroying itself as a constitutional state, and no one cares.”

The analysis described above is also confirmed by legal scholar Dr. Alexandra Hofer from Utrecht University. “The people affected receive no information. No charges, no facts, nothing. This is not a legal measure, but an administrative one,” says Hofer. According to Hofer, the regime of these sanctions has its roots in anti-terrorism legislation passed after the 9/11 attacks. Under the Lisbon Treaty (2007), the Council of Europe has acquired the right to take preventive action against the threat of terrorist attacks, allowing it to take measures against foreign terrorists without having to go through legal proceedings. “But,” says Hofer, “now this instrument is being used against its own citizens who are critical of EU policy.”

Pascal Lottaz, an assistant professor of neutrality studies at the Waseda Institute for Advanced Study in Tokyo, points out that anyone can be subject to the sanctions. “It can happen to any of us. All the Council of Europe has to do is accuse someone of manipulating and interfering with so-called foreign information. A single paragraph in which literally anything can be contested is sufficient. We are at the mercy of anonymous officials.” He fears that the sanctions now in place are only the beginning. “They now have this instrument. A very useful tool. You can use it against anyone and anything.”

Martin Giese, a representative of the German Foreign Ministry, responding to a journalist’s question about the legitimacy of these sanctions, mentioned: “[...] people who do such things can be punished if there is a legal basis for it and if the Council of the European Union has made a decision to that effect. This happened on Monday, it will happen again in the future, it has happened before, and anyone operating in this field must take into account that it could happen to them too. [...]”

The application of sanctions clearly violates various provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), such as freedom of expression, freedom of movement, the right to privacy, the right to property, the prohibition of discrimination, the right to effective legal protection, etc. Ironically, however, the European Union has never ratified the ECHR (this has been done by the member states) or signed the ICCPR.

There is a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which reiterates the main rights mentioned in the ECHR and is supposed to guarantee the fundamental rights of EU citizens, but is ignored when sanctions come into play – namely the right to private and family life, freedom of expression and information, freedom of occupation and the right to work, freedom to conduct a business, the right to property, non-discrimination, the right to fair administration, the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial. There are also conflicts with other legal acts, e.g. the vagueness of the concept of “infringement” may be seen as a conflict with Article 296 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which states that EU legislation must be clear and precise so that individuals and companies can understand and defend their rights.

Former lawyer Frank Stadermann, who provided legal assistance to a number of doctors that were critical of the government policies during the coronavirus crisis and who recently published the book Corona Inquisition, says that “it is deeply unacceptable that anyone can be punished outside of national laws and without access to a national (criminal) court that could decide on the measure/punishment. A person has the right to have their complaint about a violation of fundamental rights by the EU reviewed by an independent court. This is not so much a question of interpreting the law as it is of respecting the basic principles on which legislation is based or should be based.”

The importance of the principles of the rule of law in a crisis

The rule of law means that state power is bound by law, power is exercised on the basis of laws, and the fundamental rights of individuals are always protected. The question of the validity of the principles of the rule of law in times of crisis is one of the central tests of a democratic society, because it is precisely in times of crisis that there is increased pressure to make quick decisions, concentrate power, and restrict rights.

The European Union has moved and will probably continue to move from one crisis to another (coronavirus, the war in Ukraine, climate, energy, economy, etc.), and in the process, the European Commission and the Council of the European Union have visibly, as well as imperceptibly increased their power. However, crises, whether they be security, health, economic, or so-called information crises, must not override the rule of law. On the contrary, during a crisis, the principles of the rule of law become particularly important, as extraordinary situations increase the risk of abuse of power.

Any restriction of a fundamental right must be based on a clear legal basis. When the state or the European Union exercises special powers, their content, scope, and duration must be precisely defined. Measures that are excessive or unnecessary must not be implemented, and a crisis does not automatically justify severe interventions. It is also important to maintain the separation of powers and oversight: parliamentary oversight, an independent judiciary, and a free media are sources of democratic legitimacy. Extraordinary measures must be limited in time and reviewed regularly, because if crisis measures become permanent, the line between normal and extraordinary becomes blurred and there is a risk that the exception becomes the norm. Finally, transparency and accountability are crucial. Citizens must be able to understand why specific measures are being implemented and how they can be challenged.

In summary, it can be said that recent “crises” have led to the normalization of emergency thinking. If the language and logic of crisis are used permanently, there is a growing risk that standard safeguards of the rule of law, such as the presumption of innocence, individual responsibility, and judicial review, will be superseded by collective assessments and preventive intervention. This is particularly dangerous in the case of measures based on vague concepts such as “contradiction with objectives and values,” “connection,” “area of influence,” or “potential threat,” rather than on specific criminal proceedings. By silencing dissent, we are moving step by step towards totalitarianism, where the authorities control the narrative, prohibit fact-based criticism, and dictatorially determine which ideas are permissible and which ones are not.

The European Union’s practice of sanctions shows how quickly such control of the narrative can become dangerous, setting a precedent for restricting free thought and democracy.